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Abstract  
The paper employs a rank-dependent formulation of the social welfare function with 
time-separable utilities to evaluate the economic consequences of income mobility from 
an ex-ante perspective.  The resultant class of measures can be decomposed not only in 
terms of structural and exchange mobility but also in terms of vertical and horizontal 
mobility, thereby encompassing two of the main approaches in the literature.  We 
illustrate our measurement framework by comparing mobility in the USA and Germany 
using data from the Cross-National Equivalent File 1980-2005.  We find that the pattern 
of income mobility in the USA was both less pro-poor and more horizontally inequitable 
than in Germany, but that the latter did not translate into higher levels of exchange 
mobility given higher levels of absolute inequality and the vertical stance of the growth 
process.  
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1. Introduction 
A number of recent developments in the measurement of income mobility have been 
motivated by a desire to better understand the sources of observed changes in cross-
section or snapshot inequality over time.  The basis for much of this work has been the 
distinction between ‘structural’ and ‘exchange’ mobility, originally derived from the 
sociology literature, where the former is identified with changes in the location and shape 
of the marginal income distribution and the latter with changes in the ranking of 
individuals within the distribution (see, for example, Silber, 1995; Ruiz-Castillo, 2004; 
van Kerm, 2004).  A key feature of this approach is that the reranking effect is generally 
perceived to be a socially desirable phenomenon, consistent with the view that exchange 
mobility serves to equalise incomes over the longer term (see also Yitzhaki and Wodon, 
2004; Fields 2005).   
 
Mobility may also usefully be considered as a form of redistribution, which serves to 
emphasise the formal similarities with the analysis of the properties of tax and benefit 
schemes.  In particular, Benabou and Ok (2001) argue that mobility is socially desirable 
if it is progressive in the sense that the ratio of expected income growth to initial income 
declines with the initial level of income.  Nonetheless, it is apparent that their proposed 
summary index of equalizing mobility, based on Reynolds and Smolensky (1977), does 
not capture the whole of the redistributive impact of mobility because it fails to allow for 
classical horizontal inequities associated with the dispersion of individual growth paths 
about conditional expected rates: if individual utilities are concave in income then 
welfare will be higher if all incomes grow at conditional expected rates.  Moreover, as is 
acknowledged by Benabou and Ok (2001), if individuals are risk averse then the 
conditional expected growth rate will be preferred to the prospect of facing a lottery 
yielding the same outcome on average. From either perspective, the conditional 
dispersion of income prospects will appear to be a socially undesirable phenomenon.   
 
Shorrocks (1978, p.1016) argues that “interest in mobility is not only concerned with 
movement but also predictability – the extent to which future positions are dictated by the 
current place in the distribution.”  The main contribution of this paper is to propose a 
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framework for the measurement of mobility, based on the integrative approach of Duclos 
et al. (2003) to the measurement of redistribution, that can account for the reranking of 
individuals and classical horizontal inequities as distinct phenomena, even though both 
will usually arise from the divergence in the fortunes of those with initially identical 
incomes.  Within this framework, welfare gains due to income mobility are evaluated 
from an ex-ante, risk-neutral perspective and expressed in terms of changes in equally 
distributed equivalent (ede) incomes.  The resultant class of measures may be 
decomposed either in terms of structural and exchange mobility or in terms of vertical 
mobility, which is determined by the scale and distribution of income growth, and 
horizontal mobility, which reflects the inequity associated with the conditional dispersion 
of individual income changes.  We subsequently extend our framework to take account of 
risk aversion by assuming that individuals consider some certainty equivalent when 
evaluating the set of utility opportunities that they face.  Like Gottschalk and Spolaore 
(2002), our analysis reveals a tension between the perceived value of reranking or 
reversals on the one hand and the predictability of future incomes on the other, but based 
on a rank-dependent formulation of the social welfare function with time-separable 
utilities. 
 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 introduces the proposed measures to 
characterise and quantify mobility within a two period framework in which the focus is 
on a single transition from an initial to a final state.  In Section 3 we use our measures to 
compare mobility patterns in the USA and Germany.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Measurement of mobility within a two-period framework 
We follow much of the literature in focusing on a single transition between two periods 
and establish an ‘ethical’ basis for the measurement of mobility within this framework.  
This allows us to define a measure of total mobility as the sum of separate structural and 
exchange mobility indices.  We subsequently demonstrate that this total mobility index 
may also be decomposed into a vertical mobility measure, which may be further split into 
growth and vertical redistributive components, and a horizontal mobility measure that 
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reflects classical horizontal inequities in the mobility process.  Finally we extend the 
analysis to take account of the uncertainty of future income outcomes.   
 
Let F(y1 , yT) be the joint cumulative distribution function (cdf) for initial and final period 
incomes, Y1  and YT respectively, with support contained in the positive real orthant.  Let 
p=F1(y1) be the marginal cdf for initial period incomes, where p is the proportion of the 
population with an initial income less than y1 .  The corresponding quantile function will 
be Y1(p) = F1
−1(p) for p∈[0,1], which may loosely be thought of as the income of an 
individual with a (normalised) rank of p in the period 1 distribution.  Average income in 
period 1 is 1y = ∫01Y1(p)dp.  The q-quantile function for final period incomes, YT(q), and 
average final income, Ty , are defined analogously. 
 
We employ a social evaluation function that was first proposed by Berrebi and Silber 
(1981) and has more recently been used by Duclos et al. (2003) to analyse the 
redistributive effects of taxes and transfers in a continuous setting.  This function allows 
us to define social value as the weighted average of individuals’ intertemporally 
separable utilities, where the weights are determined by individuals’ ranks in the income 
distribution.  Thus welfare in period t evaluated on the basis of contemporaneous ranks r 
is equal to:   
( ) { } { } { }1
0
( ), ( , ) ;t tW U Y r w r v dr t,r = 1,p , T,q  ε= ∫   (1) 
where utility is given as an isoelastic function of income:  
( ) ( )
1
, 1
, ; 0
ln , 1
t
t
t
y whenU y
y when
ε εε εε
−⎧ ≠⎪= ≥⎨ =⎪⎩
  (2) 
and the rank-dependent weights r (r = p, q)  are given by:  
( 1)( , ) (1 ) ; 1.vw r v v r v−= − ≥  (3) 
Equation (1) includes the utilitarian Atkinson social welfare function (Atkinson, 1970) 
and the rank-dependent S-Gini class of welfare functions (Donaldson and Weymark, 
1980, 1983; Yitzhaki, 1983) as special cases, when v=1 and ε=0 respectively.  The 
‘distributional judgement’ parameter v controls the rate at which the weights decrease 
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from poorest to richest.  Specifically, v=2 leads to weights that decrease linearly with p 
from 2 to 0, as with the conventional Gini coefficient.  Values of v>2 yield indices that 
give greater social weight to the utility of poorer individuals than implied by the 
conventional Gini.  Conversely, values of v<2 yield indices that give lesser weight to 
poorer individuals.  In the limit v  =1 and the social weights are independent of rank.  The 
parameter ε  is the well-known measure of relative inequality aversion introduced by 
Atkinson (1970).  Smaller values of ε  are associated with lower aversion to relative 
income inequality.  The limiting case of ε=0 implies inequality neutrality. 
 
Following Atkinson (1970), let the ede income of Ft(yt) be the level of income per head 
which if equally distributed would give the same level of social welfare:  
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) { } { } { }
1
1 1
1 0
1
0
( ), ( , ) , 1
0;
exp ( ), ( , ) , 1
t
t t
t
U Y r w r v dr when
U W t,r = 1,p , T,q
U Y r w r v dr when
εε εξ ε
ε ε
−
−
⎧⎪ ≠⎪= = ≥⎨⎪ =⎪⎩
∫
∫
(4) 
where Wt  is as defined in (1).  Measuring mobility in terms of changes in ede income 
rather than welfare ensures that all indices are expressed in monetary terms, thereby 
providing a direct indication of the underlying scale of income movements.  Accordingly, 
the ‘cost of inequality’ is defined as the income per head which could be sacrificed with 
no loss of welfare if the remainder were to be distributed equally:  
; ,t t tA y t 1 Tξ= − =  (5) 
where 0t ty A≥ ≥  since 0t ty ξ≥ ≥  by construction.  This is an absolute rather than a 
relative measure of inequality, leading to a simple additive decomposition of total 
mobility into growth and redistributive elements that is independent of the order of 
evaluation.  For the limiting case of ε=0, t tWξ =  and ( ) ( )10 1 ,t tA Y r w r v dr⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦∫  is 
identified as the absolute S-Gini coefficient.    
 
In keeping with common usage in the sociological literature, structural mobility is 
associated with changes in the set of available income opportunities over time.  We 
measure structural mobility as the observed change in ede incomes between the two 
periods: 
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( ) ( )1 1 1( )S T T T G RM y y A A M Mξ ξ= − = − + − = + , (6) 
which is equal, if v=2 and ε=0, to the first total mobility index proposed by Silber and 
Weber (2005).  More generally, MS  may be seen to provide a ‘snapshot’ measure of total 
mobility that fully captures the welfare effects of income growth if movements of, but not 
within, the income distribution are of social concern.  MS  may be decomposed, in the 
manner of van Kerm (2004) or Silber and Weber (2005),  to provide a ‘growth’ mobility 
index, MG , due to the change in mean income over the period, and a ‘redistributive’ 
mobility index1, MR , due to the change in the per capita cost of inequality.  MR  is 
invariant to equal absolute (not proportionate) growth in all incomes whereas MG  is 
invariant to any redistribution of a given total income among the population.  MS  is a 
‘directional’ measure with growth in mean incomes and reductions in cross-sectional or 
snapshot inequality contributing positively to the value of the index.         
 
Corresponding to our definition of structural or snapshot mobility, we identify exchange 
mobility with the permutation of a fixed set of income opportunities among individuals.  
Thus exchange mobility is independent of structural mobility as it does not affect the 
level of welfare evaluated on a period-by-period basis.  Nevertheless, exchange mobility 
is seen to be socially desirable inasmuch as it serves to attenuate initial disparities in 
incomes over time.  The ex-ante evaluation of the incomes that individuals receive in 
period T based on their rank positions in period 1 yields: 
( )1 1
0 0
( ), ( , )X TW U Y q w p v dq dpε= ∫ ∫  (7) 
where WX  will generally exceed WT  as a result of the reranking of individuals within the 
income distribution.  Accordingly, we measure exchange mobility as:  
( )( )X X T T XM A Aξ ξ= − = − . (8) 
where ( )1X XU Wξ −= , X X XA y ξ= −  and the second equality holds because X Ty y= .  We 
note that if v=2 and ε=0 then XM y= HA P , where HA P  is the well-known Atkinson-
Plotnick reranking index which is considered by Yitzhaki and Wodon (2004) as a 
measure of mobility in its own right.  MX  will in general be non-negative as the 
                                                 
1 This term is identified as ‘structural’ mobility in Silber and Weber (2005) 
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concentration curve for period T income (with individuals ranked on the basis of period 1 
incomes) will lie on or above the Lorenz curve for period T income, because for any 
proportion of the population q, the Lorenz curve records the income share of those 
individuals with the lowest 100q percent of period T, and not of some other group whose 
period 1 incomes happen to be the lowest.  The index may be interpreted as a measure of 
the extent to which structural mobility overstates the disequalising effects of income 
growth from an ex-ante perspective due to the reshuffling of individuals within the 
distribution.  For any given change in cross-sectional inequality, social value will be 
maximised ex-ante by the complete inversion of the rank ordering of income between the 
two periods.   
 
The sum of structural and exchange mobility indices yields: 
1( ) ( )N X S X G R XM M + M  M + M  + Mξ ξ= − = =  (9) 
which is equal, if v=2 and ε=0, to the second total mobility index proposed by Silber and 
Weber (2005).  More generally, MN  fully captures the effects of income growth from an 
ex-ante perspective if individuals are risk neutral.  It is an ‘ex-ante’ measure in that the 
evaluation of welfare in both the initial and final periods is based on the social weights 
associated with individuals’ ranks in the initial income distribution.  This asymmetric 
treatment of the utility changes associated with individual income movements may be 
justified by a concern for the initially poor (Dardanoni, 1993), where the ‘distributional 
judgement’ parameter v  allows one to calibrate the poverty focus of the evaluation (see 
Essama-Nssah, 2005; Van Kerm, 2006).  It is also possible in principle to employ 
individuals’ final period weights to evaluate mobility (see, for example, the third total 
mobility index proposed by Silber and Weber, 2005) but the forward-looking perspective 
is the more natural one when assessing the impact of mobility over time. 
 
The risk-neutral mobility index MN  may also be decomposed into vertical and (classical) 
horizontal mobility measures if mobility is considered as form of redistribution.  Vertical 
mobility relates to how well individuals with different levels of initial income fare on 
average over time, whereas horizontal mobility has to do with the divergence in the 
fortunes of those with initially identical levels of income.  The key to the alternative 
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decomposition thus rests on the identification of expected period T incomes conditional 
upon initial income (rank) 
1
0
( ) ( | )T TY p Y q p dq= ∫ .  The ex-ante evaluation of this 
conditional expected income distribution yields:  
( )1
0
( ), ( , )E TW U Y p w p v dpε= ∫  (10) 
and the corresponding ede income ( )1E EU Wξ −= .  Hence: 
1 1( ) ( ) ( )N X E X E V HM M + M  ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ= − = − + − =  (11) 
where MV and MH are identified respectively as vertical and horizontal mobility indices.  
The former is determined by conditional expected income changes whereas the latter is 
determined by the conditional dispersion of income changes.  Hence MV and MH are 
independent terms in that a change in vertical mobility may occur without affecting the 
level of horizontal mobility and vice versa.  
 
The vertical index MV may be further decomposed to show how vertical mobility is 
determined by both the scale and pattern of income growth across the income range: 
( ) ( )1 1 1( )V E E E G EM y y A A M Mξ ξ= − = − + − = + . (12) 
where E Ty y=  by construction and E E EA y ξ= −  .  Equation (12)  provides a counterpart to 
the decomposition of MS in (5), with the common element MG  providing a measure of 
mean income growth over the whole population as before.  The vertical equity index ME  
provides a measure of the vertical stance of the mobility process and may be interpreted 
as an index of equalising opportunity in the sense of Benabou and Ok (2001).  For the 
limiting case, ε=0: 
( ) ( ) ( )11 10 1 ,E E TM A A Y p Y p w p v dp⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − = − − −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦∫  (13) 
which is the negative of the absolute S-concentration coefficient of conditional expected 
income growth calculated using initial year rankings.  This in turn equals the product of 
the negative of the corresponding relative S-concentration coefficient, which provides an 
absolute counterpart of the extended Kakwani-type (1977) progressivity index of Jenkins 
and van Kerm (2006), and mean income growth. Thus ME  will be positive if income 
growth is progressive (regressive) in absolute terms such that expected income gains are 
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a decreasing (increasing) function of initial income, and will equal zero if the growth 
schedule is uniform.  More generally, ME  will depend on both the distribution and scale 
of expected income growth.   
 
The horizontal index MH will be non-positive reflecting the ex-ante welfare loss due to 
the classical horizontal inequity associated with the condition dispersion of future 
incomes.  To see this point note that (7) may be re-written as: 
( ) ( )11 1
0 0
0
( | ), ( , ) , ( , ) ;X T TW U Y q p dq w p v dp U p w p v dpε ε⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫ ∫  (14) 
where ( ),TU p ε  is expected utility in period T conditional upon rank in period 1.  ξE  will 
exceed ξX  if the utility function is concave and MH will therefore be non-positive.  Thus 
the index may be interpreted as a measure of the extent to which vertical mobility 
overstates the positive effects of income growth because it fails to allow for the inequity 
manifest in the divergent fortunes of those with initially identical incomes. MH will 
capture both the inefficiency and the unfairness manifest in such inequity given the 
specification of the welfare function (cf. Broome, 1989). 
 
Hence, if individuals are risk neutral, total mobility may be seen from an ex-ante 
perspective as the sum either of structural and exchange mobility or of vertical and 
horizontal mobility.  To see the link between these alternative decompositions it is useful 
to characterise mobility as a stochastic process in utilities.  By definition, the relationship 
between final and initial period utilities can be written as: 
( )1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ;T p T pU p f U p + U p  pε ε ω ε ω= = + ∀  (15) 
where the growth function ( )1( , )f U p ε  is identified as the expected value of final period 
utility conditional upon initial utility (rank); and ωp is a ‘disturbance’ term having zero 
mean at each rank in the initial distribution.  If, as is commonly assumed (see e.g. 
Dardanoni, 1993; Benabou and Ok, 2001), the mobility process is monotonic (implying 
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that ( )1( , )f U p ε is increasing in initial utilities) then  MN = MS = MV if = 0p pω ∀ ,2 
which provides a useful counter-factual benchmark against which to assess the 
consequences of a stochastic component in the mobility process.  Specifically, we note 
that MN is invariant to noise in the utility growth process, since WX is shown in (14) to 
depend on conditional mean not actual utilities in period T, but that this is not true of MS 
unless v = 1 nor of MV unless ε = 0.  In general, higher conditional dispersion in utility 
growth rates will be associated both with an increase in cross-sectional inequality in the 
final period offset by a rise in exchange mobility due to greater reranking and with more 
progressive income growth offset by an increase in (classical) horizontal mobility due to 
the lower predictability of future incomes.  Exchange and horizontal mobility may thus 
be seen as two sides of the same coin.  But, whereas the persistence of inequality over 
time may be seen to be more tolerable if accompanied by higher levels of exchange 
mobility, the pursuit of a pro-poor growth strategy will be seen to be less advantageous if 
accompanied by higher levels of horizontal mobility.   
 
In contrast, Jenkins and van Kerm (2006) consider reranking to be a negative 
phenomenon that exacerbates cross-sectional inequality compared to what it would be if 
the growth process did not induce any reshuffling of individuals in the income 
distribution.  This difference may appear purely presentational in that we could achieve a 
similar reversal within our framework by writing MS = MN −MX instead of MN = MS + MX, 
which would imply MR = ME−MX  rather than ME = MR + MX for the limiting case of ε= 0.  
However, the interpretation of this alternative formulation in terms of the distinct 
redistributive effects of income growth progressivity and reranking is problematic in that 
neither MX  nor ME  is invariant to exchange mobility – indeed a simple permutation of 
                                                 
2  Reranking may also arise from “utility traps” in the growth schedule, i.e. if expected 
utilities in period T are a decreasing function of period 1 utility over some range.   If the 
growth function is both non-stochastic and non-monotonic then M will equal MV but not 
MS.  In general, the extent of any systematic reranking may be estimated as the difference 
between the absolute concentration coefficients of final utility ranked by expected final 
utility and by initial utility.  For a given change in cross-sectional inequality, the presence 
of systematic reranking will result in the mobility process being more progressive than it 
would otherwise have been.   
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incomes must induce offsetting changes in MX  and ME  since cross-sectional inequality 
depends only on the marginal distributional of income.  We would say instead that 
inequality in period T is higher than it otherwise would be if future incomes were 
uniquely determined by initial income, noting that ME  is invariant to a change in the 
conditional dispersion of individuals’ incomes even though it is sensitive to a simple 
permutation of incomes.  Indeed, −MX  is simply the difference between the absolute 
Ginis of predicted and actual final period income if the stochastic process is monotonic. 
 
We further note that MN will not fully capture the full economic consequences of the 
unpredictability of future utilities if individuals are risk averse.  We can extend our 
measurement framework if 0 1ε≤ ≤  to take account of risk aversion by considering the 
certainty-equivalent values of utility in period T.  Assuming that individuals in period 1 
know both their current utility and the conditional density of utility outcomes in period T, 
we define certainty-equivalent utility as: 
[ ]( )
[ ]( )
1
1 1 1
0
1
0
( ( | ), ) , 1
ˆ ( , , ) 0;1 0;
exp log ( ( | ), ) , 1
T
T
T
U Y q p dq when
U p
U Y q p dq when
η ηε ηη ε η ε
ε η
− −⎧⎪ ≠⎪= ≥ ≥ ≥⎨⎪ =⎪⎩
∫
∫
  (16) 
where η is the well known Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA), with 
lower values of the parameter implying lower aversion to risk and the limiting case of η 
=0 indicating risk neutrality.  Replacing ( , )TU p ε in (10) by ˆ ( , , )TU p η ε  yields: 
1
0
ˆ ( , , ) ( , )A TW U p w p v dpη ε= ∫  (17) 
and the corresponding ede income ( )1A AU Wξ −= .  ξA will be less than ξX implying that 
risk averse individuals will prefer the offer of the conditional expectation ( , )TU p ε  to the 
prospect of facing a lottery yielding the same outcome on average.  Indeed, ξA may even 
be lower than ξT if the social benefits of exchange mobility are more than offset by the 
perceived costs of utility uncertainty.  Accordingly, the risk adjustment index:  
( )A A XM ξ ξ= −  (18) 
will be non-positive, providing a measure of the extent to which MN overstates the 
positive effects of mobility because it fails to allow for the uncertainty manifest in the 
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divergent fortunes of those with initially identical incomes.  And it is no longer 
unambiguously the case that the prospect of more exchange mobility will be preferable to 
less holding the level of snapshot mobility MS constant (i.e. for a given change in the 
marginal utility distribution). 
 
Finally, we note that all our mobility indices are expressed in monetary terms and are 
therefore not invariant to the choice of currency units.  However all the indices may 
appropriately be normalised by the initial level of ede income ξ 1 , given that the 
measurement framework provides an evaluation of the mobility process from the 
standpoint of the initial distribution of income.  Moreover MG , which captures the effects 
of income growth, may suitably be expressed as a proportion of mean income in the 
initial period 1y .  Similarly MR , MX , ME  and MA , which capture various aspects of the 
redistributive characteristics of the process, can be stated as a proportion of the per capita 
cost of inequality in the initial period A1 . 
 
Estimation of mobility indices 
Estimation of the mobility indices requires (sample weighted) observations on an 
identical sample at two points in time.  W1  and WT  in (1) are estimated as weighted sums 
of sample utilities, where the utilities are calculated from (2) and the weights from (3) 
using the formula given in Lerman and Yitzhaki (1989) to obtain the normalised rank r of 
each (sample weighted) observation.  MS , MG  and MR  are then calculated from (6) using 
the definitions of  ξt and At in (4) and (5).  WX  is evaluated in similar fashion, cumulating 
final incomes over positions in the initial rather than the final income distribution, to 
yield an estimate of Xξ with which to calculate non-parametric estimates of MX  and MN  
from (8) and (9) respectively.   
 
Estimation of MV  and MH  is less straightforward as it requires knowledge of the 
conditional expectation of final incomes, ( )TY p , with which to calculate WE , and 
hence Eξ , using (10).  To proceed, we note that ( )TY p may be estimated as a function of 
initial incomes, i.e. [ ] ( )1 1( ) | ( ) ( )T TY p E Y Y p g Y p≡ = , using a suitable non-parametric 
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technique to avoid the need to specify the precise form that the function g(•) might take.  
Assuming that the conditional distribution of period T incomes is lognormal,3 the variable 
span smoother of Sasieni (1998) is used to fit a local linear regression to the (sample 
weighted) observations on lnyT and y1 in the neighbourhood of each data point in the 
sample,4 from which estimates of the conditional expectation of final incomes 
2( ) exp( 0.5 )T p pY p μ σ= +  are generated by replacing the conditional mean and variance 
of period T log-incomes, pμ  and 2pσ  respectively, with their sample counterparts.  
However a problem arises in that the resultant estimate of Eξ will not be consistent with 
the non-parametric estimate of Xξ .5  To overcome this problem, we first calculate an 
alternative estimate of WX , and hence Xξ , from (14) using the local regression estimates 
of pμ  and 2pσ  to calculate conditional mean utilities from:  
( ) { }2 2exp (1 ) 0.5(1 ) 1,
1
p p
T
p
when
U p
when
ε μ ε σ εε μ ε
⎧ = − + − ≠⎪⎨= =⎪⎩
 
The alternative estimate of Xξ is then used in (10) to derive initial estimates of MV and 
MH , which are scaled to sum to the non-parametric estimate of MN .  ME  is subsequently 
obtained by subtraction of MG  from the scaled estimate of MV . 
 
Finally, calculation of MA  using (18) requires knowledge of the conditional distribution 
of final utilities so as to obtain mutually consistent estimates of WX  and WA , and hence 
Xξ and Aξ , from (14) and (17) respectively.  For this purpose, we again use our estimates 
of pμ  and 2pσ  to calculate ( , )TU p ε  and ˆ ( , , )TU p η ε , where the latter is given as: 
                                                 
3 Biewen (2002) has previously noted that the distribution of net equivalised household 
incomes in GSOEP is approximately lognormal and the assumption is more generally 
consistent with the positive skewness that is characteristic of income distributions.  
Mobility estimates based on the alternative assumption that the conditional distributions 
are normal with truncation from below at zero were very similar to those reported in the 
paper. 
4 The use of a local linear regression estimator may be expected to provide a reasonable 
approximation to g(•) so long as the curvature of the unknown function is not excessive 
(Hastie and Loader, 1993).   
5 For example, WE=WX  if ε=0 but this equality will likely not hold in the estimates.    
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{ }( )
( )
1
2 2 2 1
1
2 1
1
1
2
2
exp (1 )(1 ) 0.5(1 ) (1 ) 1 1
exp (1 ) ( ) 1 1
ˆ ( , , ) 1 (1 ) 1 1
2
1exp ln 1 1
2
p p
T p
p
p
p
p
p
when and
p when and
U p
when and
when and
η
ηη
η
ε η μ ε η σ ε η
ε μ ε η
η ε σμ η η ε ημ
σμ ε ημ
−
−
−
+
⎧⎪ − − + − − ≠ ≠= ⎨⎪ − ≠ =⎩
⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎪ − − = ≠⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎝ ⎠≈ ⎨⎪ ⎛ ⎞− = =⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎩
with the approximations for ˆ ( , , )TU p η ε when 1ε =  based on second-order Taylor-series 
expansions about pμ .6  
 
 
3.  Empirical illustration 
We apply our measurement framework to a comparative study of income mobility in the 
USA and Germany.  The primary purpose of this study is to illustrate the use of our 
measures, but the application also makes a substantive contribution to the growing body 
of empirical literature exploring the contrasting inequality trends in the two countries 
(see, for example, Burkhauser and Poupare, 1997; Gottschalk and Spolaore, 2002; 
Massoumi and Trede, 2001; van Kerm, 2004; Jenkins and van Kerm, 2006).  As is now 
well-established, relative inequality rose in both countries over the 1980’s and 1990’s, 
but by substantially more in the USA than in Germany.  Our  analysis allows us to assess 
both  the nature of the income movements underlying these trends and their normative 
significance.  
 
The empirical study is based on the Cross-National Equivalent File 1980-2005 (Frick et 
al., 2007),7 which contains equivalently defined variables for the US Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).  Our data 
for the USA covers the period 1980-97, where 1980 is the first year of PSID data in the 
CNEF and 1997 is the last year of data available on a consecutive annual basis.  The 
                                                 
6 Allowing for higher order terms results in negligible changes in the estimates of 
certainty equivalent utilities. 
7 Further information is available from the CNEF website: 
http://www.human.cornell.edu/che/PAM/Research/Centers-Programs/German-Panel/cnef.cfm 
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German data cover the period 1984-2005, with 1984 being the first year of the GSOEP 
and 2005 being the latest year of GSOEP data in the CNEF, and include only 
observations from the original (pre-unification) West German samples.  Following 
Jenkins and van Kerm (2006), income mobility is analysed over successive five year time 
spans so the US data allow eleven decompositions referring to 1981-86, 1982-87, …., 
1991-96; and the German data sixteen decompositions for 1984-89, 1985-90, …., 1999-
2004. 
 
Our measure of income for each individual is a three-year centred moving average of 
post-government annual real household equivalent income calculated using the modified 
OECD scale.8  Averaging has commonly been used to reduce the risks of contamination 
of mobility estimates due to transitory income shocks and measurement error (Solon, 
2002).  Incomes are deflated by the consumer price index so as to reflect real purchasing 
power.  Observations with zero or negative incomes were dropped from all samples.  
Sample-specific outliers were also excluded in each decomposition using the procedure 
outlined in Jenkins and van Kerm (2006).  Sample weights and other relevant aspects of 
survey design are taken into account in all calculations.  In particular, we take into 
account that the income measure is common across individuals within a household in the 
estimation of the conditional distributions of final income and, furthermore, that it is 
correlated between panel interviews in the computation of bootstrap standard errors for 
all statistics.  
 
Table 1 illustrates the sensitivity of the empirical results to the choice of parameter 
values, presenting alternative estimates of real income mobility in the USA between 1981 
and 1986.  Following Duclos et al. (2003), we consider values of the relative inequality 
aversion parameter ε  between 0 and 1, and of the ‘distributional judgement’ parameter v 
between 1  and 4.  The main body of results reveals four main points of interest. First, in 
the absence of both rank dependence (v = 1) and inequality aversion (ε  = 0) then the risk-
                                                 
8 Using annual incomes rather than three-year moving averages yields broadly similar 
results, but with predictably higher levels of both exchange and horizontal mobility, 
resulting in an increase in the index of equalising opportunities given that redistributive 
mobility is roughly the same, and a larger risk adjustment.   
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neutral mobility index MN is simply equal to mean income growth MG, which was $2275 
in constant 1990 prices.   
 
Table 1. Real income mobility in the USA, 1981-1986 (Dollars at constant 1990 prices) 
  USA 1981-86 
Inequality aversion ε 0 0 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 
Distributional judgement ν 1 2 4 1 1 2 4 2 4 
14521 10464 7923 13600 12711 9970 7620 9473 7314Initial:  ede income 1ξ  (131) (95) (89) (114) (109) (94) (91) (95) (90)
14521 14521 14521 14521 14521 14521 14521 14521 14521 average income 1y  
(131) (131) (131) (129) (131) (129) (129) (131) (131)
0 4058 6598 921 1810 4551 6901 5049 7207 absolute inequality 1A  
- (80) (104) (32) (57) (86) (106) (96) (114)
16797 11635 8475 15494 14245 10949 8059 10257 7645Final:  ede income 
Tξ  
(180) (119) (107) (145) (140) (109) (97) (117) (107)
16797 16797 16797 16797 16797 16797 16797 16797 16797 average income 
Ty  
(180) (180) (180) (171) (180) (171) (171) (180) (180)
0 5162 8322 1302 2552 5848 8738 6540 9151 absolute inequality 
TA  
- (114) (145) (47) (85) (118) (141) (136) (157)
2275 1172 552 1894 1534 979 439 785 331 Structural mobility M S  
(115) (74) (73) (106) (85) (84) (81) (77) (78)
2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 Growth  M G  
(115) (115) (115) (115) (115) (115) (115) (115) (115)
0 -1104 -1724 -381 -741 -1297 -1837 -1491 -1944 Redistribution  M R  
- (86) (105) (38) (65) (93) (111) (100) (114)
0 1047 1528 0 0 885 1320 742 1125 Exchange mobility M X  
- (44) (56) - - (31) (49) (27) (45)
2275 2218 2080 1894 1534 1864 1759 1527 1456Risk neutral mobility  M N  
(115) (84) (91) (106) (85) (86) (90) (82) (93)
2275 2218 2080 2484 2676 2309 2139 2401 2199 Vertical mobility M V  
(115) (84) (91) (110) (99) (91) (98) (96) (112)
2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 Growth  M G  
(115) (115) (115) (115) (115) (115) (115) (115) (115)
0 -57 -196 209 400 34 -136 125 -77 Equalizing opp.  M E  
- (75) (112) (35) (61) (90) (123) (101) (132)
0 0 0 -590 -1142 -445 -380 -874 -743 Horizontal mobility M H  
- - - (22) (43) (16) (17) (35) (39)
Risk adjustment         M A  η = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  η = 0.5 -539 -418 -358 -253 -253 -201 -174 -42 -37
  (22) (16) (16) (9) (2) (7) (8) (2) (2)
  η = 1 -1060 -822 -703 -501 -501 -399 -344 -84 -75
  (43) (31) (32) (17) (4) (14) (15) (3) (4)
  η = 2 -2051 -1589 -1355 -986 -986 -784 -676 -167 -148
  (81) (57) (58) (34) (7) (26) (29) (7) (7)
  η = 4 -3845 -2973 -2520 -1908 -1908 -1515 -1302 -329 -292
  (143) (100) (100) (63) (14) (49) (53) (13) (15)
  η = 8 -6789 -5230 -4384 -3576 -3576 -2832 -2419 -636 -562
  (225) (156) (149) (112) (26) (85) (91) (24) (27)
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Second, rank dependence alone gives rise to redistributive mobility MR, due to the change 
in cross-sectional inequality as measured by the S-Gini index, and exchange mobility MX, 
due to the reshuffling of individuals within the income distribution, but not to classical 
horizontal inequities so MH equals zero.  The size of both MR and MX are increasing in the 
social weight attached to the fortunes of the initially poor.  Holding the poverty focus 
constant and increasing the level of inequality aversion reduces the size of MX due to the 
concavity of the utility function.  
 
Third, inequality aversion alone gives rise to redistributive mobility MR, due to the 
change in cross-sectional inequality as measured by the Atkinson index, and horizontal 
inequity mobility MH, due to the divergent fortunes of initially equal individuals, but not 
to reranking effects so MX equals zero.  Both MR and MH are increasing in the degree of 
inequality aversion as the inefficiency associated with both the unconditional and 
conditional dispersion of incomes rises.  Holding the level of inequality aversion fixed 
and increasing the poverty focus of the evaluation reduces the size of MH given that the 
conditional dispersion of incomes is greater among the rich than the poor.   
 
Finally, the index of equalising opportunity ME is equal to the difference between the cost 
of inequality associated with the distribution of actual incomes in the initial period and 
the distribution of expected incomes in the final period. Accordingly, the index may be 
interpreted as a residual term that reflects the balance between –MR on the one hand and 
MX and –MH on the other. A sufficient condition for mobility to be deemed “progressive” 
in absolute terms is that the positive ex-ante value of exchange mobility exceed any 
increase in cross-sectional inequality.  ME is more positive, or less negative, the higher 
the degree of inequality aversion and, hence, the more rapidly the marginal utility of 
income diminishes with income.   
 
Table 1 also reports the risk adjustment index MA for values of the relative risk aversion 
parameter η between 0 and 8 to cover the very wide range of CRRA values reported in 
the literature (see e.g. Kaplow, 2005; Meyer and Meyer, 2006). MA increases with the 
degree of risk aversion, exceeding both MX and MN for sufficiently high values of η.  By 
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implication, whether or not exchange and overall mobility are perceived to be desirable 
social phenomena from an ex-ante perspective may well depend on public attitudes to 
income uncertainty. 
 
Table 2 presents the main set of results for the USA, based on intermediate values of 
ε=0.5 and v=2, implying moderate levels of inequality aversion and concern for the poor, 
and the full range of CRRA values.  The cross-sectional statistics indicate that both mean 
income and absolute inequality rose in real terms in each 5 year sub-period between 1981 
and 1996, with the rise in the former exceeding the latter in all sub-periods except for two 
that span the recession of the early 1990’s.  Thus the analysis of structural mobility shows 
that the growth index MG  is consistently positive and the redistribution index MR  
negative, with the overall index of snapshot mobility MS  showing that welfare evaluated 
on a period-by-period basis rose in all but two of the five year spans.  The positive 
association between the magnitudes of MG  and MR  suggests that the nature of  economic 
growth in the USA was inherently disequalising, with both mean incomes and absolute 
inequality rising more rapidly during economic upswings.   
 
However, the structural analysis of mobility does not take the movement of individuals 
within the income distribution into account and may therefore overstate social 
perceptions of the disequalising effects of income growth over the period.  From an ex-
ante risk-neutral perspective, welfare rose in each sub-period as indicated by the 
consistently positive values of the mobility index MN .  By implication, the prospect of the 
income distribution five years hence was consistently preferable to the current 
distribution, evaluated on the basis of individuals’ ranking in the current distribution.  
The level of exchange mobility MX  was roughly constant over the whole period, 
suggesting that the processes leading to the reranking of individuals were largely 
unaffected by the strength of the economy.  Indeed, if anything, exchange mobility 
appears to be a mildly counter-cyclical phenomenon.  This view is reinforced by 
consideration of the horizontal mobility index MH  from the alternative decomposition of 
MN .  Thus MH , which is determined by the conditional dispersion of income prospects 
over each five year time span, similarly lies within a relatively narrow range over the 
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Table 2. Real income mobility in the USA over successive 5 year spans, 1981-1996 (US Dollars at constant 1990 prices): ε=0.5, υ=2.  
Period  81-86 82-87 83-88 84-89 85-86 86-91 87-92 88-93 89-94 90-95 91-96 
9966 9993 10177 10330 10565 10819 11142 11333 11507 11580 11890 Initial:  ede income 1ξ  (97) (98) (97) (99) (105) (116) (115) (131) (125) (135) (117) 
14481 14709 15199 15575 16163 16599 17260 17622 18028 18270 18813  average income 1y  
(116) (116) (118) (120) (113) (126) (118) (129) (128) (153) (118) 
4515 4716 5021 5245 5598 5780 6119 6289 6521 6689 6923  absolute inequality 1A  
(87) (80) (101) (88) (114) (109) (150) (144) (160) (205) (177) 
10951 11227 11457 11488 11515 11461 11632 11539 11327 11152 12163 Final:  ede income 
Tξ  
(129) (167) (132) (157) (160) (181) (169) (198) (209) (208) (197) 
16763 17285 17767 18081 18231 18270 18463 18470 18373 18415 19614  average income 
Ty  
(135) (137) (140) (136) (164) (177) (195) (208) (223) (270) (217) 
5812 6058 6309 6593 6717 6809 6832 6931 7046 7263 7451  absolute inequality 
TA  
(184) (212) (184) (217) (209) (240) (209) (252) (275) (272) (243) 
2281 2575 2568 2506 2068 1671 1203 847 346 146 801  Growth  M G  
(120) (145) (115) (144) (135) (163) (165) (152) (165) (151) (156) 
-1297 -1342 -1288 -1348 -1119 -1029 -713 -642 -526 -574 -528  Redistribution  M R  
(93) (127) (99) (117) (129) (134) (149) (133) (148) (123) (144) 
984 1234 1280 1158 949 642 490 205 -180 -428 273  Structural mobility M S  
(79) (80) (79) (78) (81) (81) (77) (90) (80) (104) (81) 
875 909 915 918 901 861 872 901 939 990 947  Exchange mobility M X  
(28) (34) (30) (30) (26) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (33) 
1859 2143 2195 2076 1850 1503 1362 1106 759 562 1220 Risk neutral mobility  M N  
(83) (87) (85) (85) (84) (87) (84) (97) (84) (116) (82) 
2294 2592 2664 2556 2318 1987 1882 1664 1420 1230 1755  Vertical mobility M V  
(87) (93) (90) (90) (87) (93) (90) (104) (89) (123) (82) 
2281 2575 2568 2506 2068 1671 1203 847 346 146 801  Growth  M G  
(120) (145) (115) (144) (135) (163) (165) (152) (165) (151) (156) 
12 17 95 50 250 316 679 816 1074 1084 954  Equalizing opp. M E  
(89) (127) (101) (122) (130) (137) (147) (136) (147) (130) (139) 
 Horizontal mobility M H  -434 -450 -468 -480 -468 -485 -520 -557 -661 -669 -535 
  (15) (20) (16) (14) (14) (14) (19) (21) (26) (21)            (38) 
Risk adjustment: M A  η = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   -198 -207 -211 -213 -206 -205 -216 -229 -237 -245 -225 
 
η = 0.5 
(7) (8) (7) (6) (6) (6) (8) (9) (9) (8) (9) 
   -392 -410 -418 -423 -408 -407 -428 -453 -469 -484 -445 
 
η = 1 
(13) (17) (14) (12) (11) (12) (15) (17) (18) (16) (17) 
   -770 -805 -821 -831 -803 -800 -840 -889 -919 -948 -875 
 
η = 2 
(25) (32) (26) (23) (21) (24) (29) (33) (34) (32) (32) 
   -1489 -1555 -1585 -1605 -1552 -1546 -1621 -1712 -1767 -1821 -1689 
 
η = 4 
(47) (60) (49) (43) (40) (45) (54) (60) (63) (59) (59) 
   -2786 -2907 -2962 -2997 -2905 -2892 -3023 -3178 -3270 -3361 -3155 
 
η = 8 
(82) (105) (86) (75) (70) (79) (95) (103) (108) (103) (101) 
Note:  Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses based on 200 replications. 
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whole study period but is significantly higher in those sub-periods spanning the 
slowdown of the early 1990’s.  We conclude that future incomes were less predictable in 
the USA during slowdowns given that both exchange and horizontal mobility may be 
seen to arise from the stochastic nature of the mobility process. 
 
The results of the alternative decomposition also show that distribution of expected 
income opportunities in the final year of each sub-period was consistently equalising 
from an ex-ante welfare perspective, as indicated by the positive values of ME , with 
income mobility more “progressive” in absolute terms during economic slowdowns.  
These findings appear to conflict with the evidence that cross-sectional inequality was 
increasing throughout the whole period, but may be reconciled once exchange and 
horizontal mobility are taken into account.  Jenkins and van Kerm (2006) have explained 
in detail how pro-poor income growth can be accompanied by rising inequality due to the 
reshuffling of individuals within the income distribution over time.  Measuring inequality 
in relative terms, they report that exchange mobility exceeded the rise in inequality in the 
USA throughout the 1980’s.  In contrast, measuring inequality in absolute terms, we find 
exchange mobility MX  to have only exceeded the disequalising effects of redistributive 
mobility MR  in the latter sub-periods spanning the slowdown of the early 1990’s.9  
However, within our framework, costs of inequality may also arise from the classical 
horizontal inequities associated with the divergence in individual income changes about 
conditional mean growth rates.  Thus income mobility would be MV  rather than MN , 
evaluated ex-ante on a risk-neutral basis, if all individuals received conditional mean 
incomes in the final year of each sub-period, where the former (but not the latter) exceeds 
MG  in all sub-periods.  Figure 1 displays the concentration curves of the utility changes 
associated with conditional mean income growth, with individuals ranked in ascending
                                                 
9 If  ε  is set equal to zero then mobility is deemed to be progressive (i.e. MX   + MR  > 0 
since MH  = 0 in this case) in all sub-periods from 1985-90 onwards, providing a direct 
counterpart of the Jenkins and van Kerm (2006) results but with inequality measured in 
absolute rather than relative terms. 
 20
order of utility in the initial year, for 1981-86, 1986-91 and 1991-96.10  All three curves 
lie above the line of perfect equality indicating that opportunities for utility growth were 
consistently progressive in absolute terms from an ex-ante perspective.  Moreover, the 
three curves lie ever further above the line of perfect equality indicating that the absolute 
progressivity of the mobility process was negatively associated with income growth 
which was weaker in each successive sub-period.  Indeed, it is evident from the 
concentration curve for 1991-96 that the conditional mean income growth of many of 
those in the top income quintile in 1991 was negative over this five year time span. 
 
Figure 1. Concentration curves of utility changes associated with conditional mean 
income growth ordered by utility in the initial year: USA 1981-86, 1986-91 and 1991-96. 
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10 Note that ME  can not in general be written as a weighted sum of the utility changes  
associated with individual income movements.  Nevertheless, the Figure does serve to 
corroborate the positive values obtained for ME  by illustrating the progressivity of 
individual utility changes in absolute terms. 
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Finally, the estimates of the risk adjustment index MA in Table 2 serve as a reminder that 
social perceptions of income mobility are sensitive to attitudes to risk.  In particular, the 
ex-ante welfare loss due to risk aversion would have exceeded the perceived benefits of 
exchange mobility, holding the level of snapshot mobility MS constant, if the CRRA had 
been greater than about two.  Overall, mobility would not have been perceived ex-ante as 
resulting in a loss of welfare unless the CRRA had been appreciably greater than four 
during the economic recovery of the early 1980’s, but this value drops to only about one 
in the slowdown of the early 1990’s.   
 
Table 3 presents comparable results for Germany for the period 1985-2004, from which it 
emerges that the nature of the mobility process was broadly similar to that in the USA.  
First, income growth was disequalising in absolute terms, with cross-sectional income 
inequality actually falling during the post-unification recession of the early 1990’s.  
However, Figure 2 shows that the trade-off between income growth and inequality was 
more favourable in Germany than the USA, with the lower trend line for Germany 
indicating that a given proportionate change in mean income was associated with a 
smaller proportionate change in absolute inequality in Germany.  That most points lie 
above the 45° line implies that relative inequality rose in virtually all sub-periods in both 
countries. 
 
Second, the degree of unpredictability of future incomes appears largely insensitive to the 
state of the economy as indicated by the relatively stable values of MX  and MH .  However 
there is some evidence of pro-cyclicality, unlike the USA, perhaps in part as a result of 
stronger social insurance mechanisms to protect incomes during recessions.  Figure 3 
shows that the trade-off between vertical and horizontal mobility was more favourable in 
Germany than the USA, with the lower trend line for Germany indicating that a given 
proportionate change in ede income due to the conditional mean growth of incomes was 
associated with a smaller proportionate loss due to the horizontal inefficiencies associated 
with the conditional dispersion of final year incomes.  In the absence of horizontal 
mobility, ede income in the final year of each sub-period would have been between 2.1% 
and 3.1% higher in Germany and between 3.8% and 5.7% higher in the USA.  However, 
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Table 3. Real income mobility in Germany over successive 5 year spans, 1985-2004 (Euro at constant 2001 prices): ε=0.5, υ=2. 
Period  85-90 86-91 87-92 88-93 89-94 90-95 91-96 92-97 93-98 94-99 95-00 96-01 97-02 98-03 99-04 
11000 11126 11429 11863 12132 12501 12805 12964 13074 12739 12945 12882 12551 12651 12675 Initial:  ede income 1ξ  (102) (111) (120) (119) (137) (142) (133) (177) (159) (234) (184) (185) (232) (206) (213)
14542 14786 15172 15710 16130 16630 17112 17586 17809 17469 17738 17763 17300 17312 17334  average income 1y  
(152) (141) (155) (161) (170) (191) (176) (276) (257) (238) (276) (283) (286) (248) (287)
3542 3660 3742 3846 3998 4129 4307 4622 4735 4730 4793 4881 4749 4661 4658  absolute inequality 1A  
(93) (92) (91) (100) (103) (114) (118) (203) (170) (139) (160) (215) (181) (157) (179)
12669 12816 12982 12954 12756 12733 12734 12745 12884 12996 13455 13330 13367 13359 13112 Final:  ede income 
Tξ  
(117) (128) (123) (126) (169) (156) (146) (163) (149) (193) (179) (212) (234) (222) (227)
16851 17194 17544 17436 17385 17280 17125 17290 17568 17778 18451 18560 18494 18482 18272  average income 
Ty  
(155) (168) (176) (177) (194) (196) (170) (231) (235) (245) (290) (272) (295) (266) (280)
4182 4379 4562 4482 4629 4547 4390 4544 4684 4782 4995 5230 5127 5124 5160  absolute inequality 
TA  
(92) (100) (105) (101) (105) (115) (95) (147) (146) (153) (173) (173) (163) (155) (153)
1669 1690 1552 1091 624 232 -71 -219 -190 257 511 448 816 708 436  Structural mobility M S  
(88) (94) (118) (103) (142) (125) (114) (112) (120) (136) (131) (150) (157) (205) (158)
2309 2408 2373 1726 1256 650 13 -296 -241 308 713 796 1193 1171 938  Growth  M G  
(119) (122) (124) (123) (133) (127) (143) (148) (133) (157) (169) (216) (184) (227) (229)
-640 -718 -820 -635 -631 -417 -84 77 51 -51 -202 -349 -378 -463 -502  Redistribution  M R  
(83) (81) (72) (84) (92) (95) (98) (106) (101) (119) (122) (174) (133) (133) (155)
963 1034 996 1003 999 990 915 891 835 873 891 1020 994 1086 1011  Exchange mobility M X  
(45) (48) (52) (56) (51) (50) (53) (60) (45) (49) (51) (75) (70) (100) (122)
2632 2723 2548 2094 1624 1222 844 672 645 1130 1402 1467 1809 1794 1448 Risk neutral mobility  M N  
(94) (101) (128) (112) (136) (133) (126) (140) (131) (142) (126) (159) (169) (260) (213)
2936 3047 2882 2425 1976 1564 1177 992 964 1439 1700 1835 2168 2222 1817  Vertical mobility M V  
(98) (107) (134) (118) (140) (139) (137) (158) (138) (148) (131) (169) (183) (286) (244)
2309 2408 2373 1726 1256 650 13 -296 -241 308 713 796 1193 1171 938  Growth  M G  
(119) (122) (124) (123) (133) (127) (143) (148) (133) (157) (169) (216) (184) (227) (229)
627 638 510 699 721 914 1164 1289 1205 1130 987 1039 975 1051 879  Vertical equity  M E  
(96) (89) (90) (95) (98) (100) (106) (118) (103) (121) (122) (149) (147) (173) (146)
-304 -323 -334 -331 -353 -342 -333 -320 -319 -308 -298 -368 -359 -428 -369  Horizontal mobility M H  
(15) (17) (16) (18) (22) (23) (22) (30) (23) (23) (16) (24) (27) (41) (46)
Risk adjustment: M A  η = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   η = 0.5 -146 -158 -161 -157 -163 -157 -157 -153 -142 -142 -141 -173 -164 -190 -173 
  (7) (8) (7) (8) (9) (10) (9) (11) (9) (10) (8) (12) (13) (17) (18) 
   η = 1 -291 -314 -319 -313 -324 -312 -313 -304 -282 -283 -281 -343 -327 -377 -343 
  (14) (16) (14) (17) (18) (19) (17) (21) (17) (21) (15) (24) (25) (33) (36) 
   η = 2 -575 -620 -631 -619 -640 -616 -618 -601 -557 -560 -556 -678 -646 -743 -678 
  (27) (31) (28) (33) (35) (38) (34) (42) (33) (40) (30) (46) (48) (64) (71) 
   η = 4 -1125 -1212 -1233 -1210 -1249 -1204 -1208 -1175 -1091 -1098 -1090 -1323 -1262 -1446 -1322 
  (52) (59) (53) (62) (66) (71) (64) (79) (64) (77) (57) (89) (92) (120) (134) 
   η = 8 -2155 -2317 -2356 -2314 -2384 -2302 -2306 -2245 -2093 -2107 -2095 -2524 -2410 -2741 -2517 
  (95) (107) (97) (114) (119) (129) (117) (142) (117) (141) (106) (161) (164) (213) (239) 
Note:  Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses based on 200 replications. 
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Figure 2. Growth of mean incomes and cross-sectional inequality.  
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Figure 3. Changes in welfare due to vertical and horizontal mobility.  
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Figure 4. Changes in welfare due to equalising opportunities and mean income growth.  
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lower levels of horizontal mobility in Germany did not translate into comparably lower 
levels of exchange mobility, which averaged about 8% of initial year ede income in both 
countries, because of lower levels of absolute inequality and more pro-poor income 
growth (see below).   
 
Third, the index of equalising opportunity ME  is consistently positive, with mobility more 
“progressive” in economic downturns.  Figure 4 shows that the trade-off between vertical 
equity and mean income growth was more favourable in Germany than the USA, with the 
higher trend line for Germany at high levels of mean income growth indicating that a 
given proportionate change in ede income due to mean income growth was associated 
with a larger proportionate rise due to vertical redistribution during economic upswings.  
We conclude that the income growth process in Germany was generally more pro-poor 
than in the USA.   
 
Finally we note that the threshold CRRA values at which the risk adjustment index 
outweigh the levels of exchange and overall mobility are higher in Germany than the 
USA, reflecting the lower levels of income uncertainty.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
The paper proposes a framework that can be used to both characterise and quantify the 
welfare effects of income mobility from an ex-ante, risk-neutral perspective.  The 
resultant class of measures can be decomposed not only in terms of structural and 
exchange mobility but also in terms of vertical and horizontal mobility, thereby 
encompassing two of the main approaches to the economic evaluation of mobility 
currently found in the literature.  We further show how the framework can be extended to 
take account of risk aversion by assuming that individuals consider some certainty 
equivalent when evaluating the set of utility opportunities that they face.  All measures 
are expressed in monetary terms and therefore provide a direct indication of the 
underlying scale of income movements. 
 
Our analysis reveals a tension between the perceived value of exchange mobility on the 
one hand and the horizontal inequities associated with the conditional dispersion of future 
 25
incomes on the other.  Given this tension, whether the stochasticity of the mobility 
process is seen as being desirable or not is likely to depend on the political culture of a 
society which in turn will shape the choice of policies that determine the future evolution 
of the income distribution.  Alesina et al. (2004) argue that the greater tolerance of 
inequality that is evident amongst the poor in America compared to Europe can be 
explained by their perception that they are living in a society with higher opportunities 
for (upward) mobility.  Conversely, more equal societies may be expected to put more 
weight on the predictability of incomes given that income differences between social 
classes are less pronounced.  Adsera and Boix (2000) characterise continental European 
models of social democracy in terms of the compression of wage differentials in 
conjunction with high levels of social insurance compared to the USA, UK and Japan. 
 
Our empirical results show that levels of both structural and vertical mobility were 
directly linked to the strength of the economy in both the USA and Germany, but that 
levels of exchange and horizontal mobility, which are primarily determined by the 
predictability of future incomes, were much less sensitive to the economic cycle.  The 
pattern of income mobility in the USA has been both less pro-poor than in Germany and 
more horizontally inequitable, but the latter did not translate into higher levels of 
exchange mobility given the vertical stance of the growth process and higher levels of 
absolute inequality.  Thus, like the majority of studies on the issue (see, for example, 
Jenkins and van Kerm, 2006), we find there to have been less exchange mobility in the 
USA than Germany, but our measurement framework also provides fresh insight into 
why, contrary to popular belief, this may have been the case.  
 
However it would be unwise to try to read too much into the empirical results.  For a 
start, the analysis in each sub-period is based on a balanced panel and income 
differentials may be expected to have changed over the five year time span simply due to 
the ageing of the sample (Ayala and Sastre, 2002). Moreover, the estimates of the 
mobility indices may be biased due to non-random sample attrition over each sub-period 
(Frick et al., 2007).  More generally, there is a need for more research into the 
determinants of individual income dynamics in order to better explain the sources of 
observed changes in cross-section or snapshot inequality over time.   
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